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RESENTMENT AND REORGANIZATION: 
ANTIWESTERN DISCOURSE AND THE MAKING OF 





A pro-European but antiwesternist discourse has historically characterized the 
Hungarian nationalist conservative right discourse. For certain segments of the 
right-wing political and cultural elite, the non-domestic has always been the West. In 
their resentment to the non-domestic, their understanding of what makes the West has 
ranged from liberalism, autonomy and partitioning, capitalism, economic and political 
liberalization, and recently federalist European integration. The rejection of such 
implications of Westernism or westernization has made them forge a counter 
discourse to what they have historically understood the West to be. They have 
ideologically separated the West from Europe. Insomuch as they have scorned the 
former, they have believed that they could transform the latter with the very help of 
Hungarian national virtues. Western Christianity as religion has occupied a crucial 
place in their quest. At times, they have emphasized Hungary as a bastion of 
Christianity in contrast to secularizing tendencies in West – suggesting that 
Hungarians chose Catholicism and has stood by Western Christianity despite the 
West. More recently, this attitude became the underlying factor in anti-immigrant 
policies and politics. At other times, they have depicted Hungarian society as the 
western most extension of Eurasian peoples, and as religious, family-oriented and 
traditional as Eurasian people should be.  
 2 
Moreover, the nationalist conservative elite pursued an antiwesternist 
discourse in the international arena as well, in order to accrue economic gains in 
non-western Eurasia. Their antiwesternism came with a search for distant cousins in a 
broad Eurasian geography that extends all the way to Japan. Antiwesternism gained 
strength particularly in times of crisis, be that political or economic. Overall, it has 
been a useful tool for the Hungarian political elite to foster the morale of the nation by 
offering an alternative geopolitical affiliation with probable economic gains – even if 
these gains remained mythical and were never to be accrued. This has been the most 
permanent element of Hungarian Eurasianism since the 19
th
 century. This article deals 
with this aspect of Eurasianism as a form of expressing antiwesternism in Hungary.  
In order to shed light on these processes, this study deals with the discursive 
framing of Hungary as an extension of Eurasia in Europe. The main narrative in 
support has been Hungarians’ kinship with the Turanian people, i.e., the non-Slavic 
and non-Chinese people of the East. In this framework, this article depicts the 
political and economic references to “what makes Hungary” or “who is Hungarian” as 
a form of new and anti-western morality that have guided the nationalist and 
conservative right. Furthermore, this study also elaborates on formulation of kinship 
and references to Eurasian people on the part of the political elite as a mechanism of 
social control seeking to economize social and political relations.  
The period under study is from the interwar period to current politics. 
Considering this period, this study delineates, first, the discursive framework within 
which the right-wing political and cultural elite have historically framed the 
Hungarian polity within an Eurasianist framework and, second, how this historical 
legacy manifests itself currently in resentment to the liberal and progressive values of 
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the West, especially much lately since the failure of left-liberal transformation in 
Hungary under the guidance of the Europeanization meta-narrative.
1
   
Hereby, the argument is as follows. A reframing of Hungary’s past and a 
parallel mythical construction of the East, either as a homeland in faraway lands or as 
a space that has hosted true Hungarianness, have qualified the resentment to West. 
This has become more manifest since the beginning of the global financial crisis in 
2008. This resentment has not been merely toward the West as geography, but also to 
those that subscribed to western progressive ideals. As an alternative, the nationalist 
conservative right has proposed more traditional, religious, patriarchal, 
communitarian values vis-à-vis the individualism that the liberal West has 
represented. While at times they have responded to westernization with 
Europeanization imbued with Hungarianness; at other times, they have totally rejected 
the West and went as far as propagating a “Turanian”, i.e., Eastern alternative.  
To this extent, they have pursued “symbolic creations to manipulate social 
relationships”2, social representation3, and collective memory. On the one hand, they 
have generated images of a “new past” to produce a stock of common knowledge and 
information that people share in the form of common-sense to arm themselves with a 
new identity and discursive tools against those of their liberal, westernized opponents. 
On the other, much recently, the “creation of a new past”, though fictitious and not 
empirically grounded, has served for “economization” of social and political 
relations.
4
 Therefore, the “new past” is social construction mainly, if not wholly, 
                                            
1 Umut Korkut, Liberalization Challenges in Hungary: Elitism, Progressivism, and Populism (New 
York: Palgrave/Europe in Transition: The NYU European Studies Series, 2012). 
2
 David R. Maines, Noreen M. Sugrue, and Michael A. Katovich, “The Sociological Import of G.H. 
Mead’s Theory of the Past,” American Sociological Review 48(April) (1983), pp.161-173.   
3
 Serge Moscovici, The phenomenon of social representations. In: R. M. Farr & S. Moscovici. eds., 
Social Representations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).  
4
 Koray Çalışkan and Michel Callon, “Economization, part 1: shifting attention from the economy 
towards processes of economization.” Economy and Society 38: 3 (2009), pp. 369-398. 
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shaped by the concerns of the present.
5
 It propagates “images and symbolic 
constructions of the past”6 to serve the current political goals. To that extent, the 
political elite also embeds economization of social and political relations into the 
recent phase of Eurasianism, and aims to re-define the current civic and private 
spheres – as the much exalted centers of power of the recent neoliberalism. 7 
Eventually, insomuch as their transformation of the collective memory of the past 
succeeds, the right-wing ideology can contravene the earlier influence of liberalism, 
and establish its own hegemonic neoliberalism.  
In order, in the first section, I will present how antiwesternism has historically 
gained a fundamental place within the intellectual traditions of the Hungarian 
conservative and nationalist right. I will foreground a history of ideas in Hungary that 
has substantiated antiwestern intellectual traditions. To this extent, I will give an 
overview of Eurasianist and Turanist thought patterns that gripped the interwar 
identity debates. In the following section, I will first illustrate my understanding of 
moral politics as an essential tool for the right-wing to contravene the liberal 
influence. What I mean by moral politics is a type of politics that vies for a new 
political system that not only bolsters an ideologically defined morality, but also 
strives to govern it. I will then shift my attention to Hungarian anti-westernism as a 
discursive tool to consolidate a new type of domestic moral politics implying social 
control aligned with nationalist and conservative political identities. In studying moral 
politics, I will pursue three research questions. That is (1) what is new in moral 
politics in Hungary? (2) what ideological tenets of moral politics promote alternative 
                                            
5
 Lewis A.Coser, trans. and ed., Maurice Halbwachs On Collective Memory (Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
6
 Barry Schwartz, Yael Zerubavel, Bernice M. Barnett, „The Recovery of Masada: A Study in 
Collective Memory,“ The Sociological Quarterly 27: 2, pp.147-164. 
7
 Esra Özyürek, Nostalgia for the Modern State Secularism and Everyday Politics in Turkey (Durham 
and London: Duke University Press, 2006).  
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geopolitical orientation? and (3) how can new moral politics seek social control on its 
opponents? In conclusion, I will re-instate how the re-introduction of Eurasianism 
serves to foster a new elite hegemony.  
 
Antiwesternism in Hungarian intellectual traditions 
Why should we study antiwesternism in Hungary? While Hungary is 
geographically located in Europe and culturally and politically has been a part of 
Western Christianity for centuries, still the nation maintains an ambiguous link with 
Eurasia. This may be a result of being at the periphery of the European system for a 
long time, but surely the recent recourse to novel geopolitical aspirations such as 
Eurasianism of its conservative and nationalist right-wing political elite serves to 
maintain this ambiguous relationship and pursue strategic gains. Furthermore, given 
Hungary’s geopolitical position at the outer flank of the European Union and in the 
neighborhood with Ukraine, Russia, and the Caucasus, Eurasian narratives and 
networks in Hungary, the venues for the expression of this narrative, and alternative 
political ideologies and life-styles find themselves largely at home in Hungary. This is 
not a recent phenomenon, but as I will delineate below, has its historical roots all the 
way back to the interwar period.
8
  
While antiwesternism has emerged as a political discourse in other eastern and 
south-eastern European states intermittently, the Hungarian antiwesternism has 
distinctly aspired for a geopolitical alternative. This sets the Hungarian version 
essentially separate from similar trends in other EU states including the Baltics.
9
 This 
alternative has been an elite-constructed, mythical, nostalgic East that promised 
                                            
8
 Umut Korkut and Emel Akçalı, “Deciphering Eurasianism in Hungary: Narratives, Networks, and 
Life-styles”, in: Marlene Laurelle. ed., Relations between Russia and the Extreme Right Parties in 
Europe (Lanham, Boulder, New York, London: Lexington Books, 2015), pp.175-192. 
9
 Emel Akçalı and Umut Korkut, “Neo-Turanism and Its Performance: Everyday Geopolitics of 
Hungarian Far-right,” Eurasian Geography and Economics 53:5 (2012), pp. 596-614. 
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Hungary more prosperity, peaceful relations, hospitable environment, and a kind of 
homely feeling. In their quest, conservative and nationalist political right has 
deliberately delineated an Eastern myth for Hungarian collective imagination. The 
East has been a space which offered a more confident political and economic 
existence for Hungary thanks to either collaborative, friendly relations with Eastern 
people’s extending all the way to Japan or prosperity and peace in the mythical land 
of Turan. Thereby, the proponents of the eastern myth strove to establish a 
“community by discourse”10 and turn resentment into geopolitical alternation. In this 
context, as Eurasianist and Turanist ideals overlapped significantly, I will discuss 
them collaboratively.   
The linguist Max Müller’s 1854 book entitled “On the Classification of 
Turanian Languages” is considered to be the origin of the Turanist idea. The linguist 
grouped all languages that did not fit in with the existing language groups into the 
Turanian language group and although this was a haphazard generalization the 
qualifier generated the Turanian myth for the nationalist soul searching at Europe’s 
semi-periphery.
11
 The Huns or Attila was celebrated in Renaissance, whose rulers 
and their historians sought to create a national history for an emerging state by 
reaching back beyond the Magyar conquests of the ninth and tenth centuries to 
imagine the foundation of Hungary by the Huns. The emphasis of Hunnic relations in 
Hungary dates back to the 15
th
 Century. The Hungarian King Matthias Corvinus 
claimed Attila as his ancestor, and as János Thuróczi’s Chronica de gestis 
                                            
10
 Robert Wuthnow, Communities of Discourse (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 
1989).  
11
 József Schmidt, “Turánizmus,” Nyugat 20 (1925), available at 
http://epa.oszk.hu/00000/00022/00382/11720.htm. 
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 Centuries, this relationship with the “victorious Eastern” also implied 
kinship with Turks. With respect to the 16
th
 Century battles with the Ottoman Empire, 
as an example, the conservative journalist historian Sándor Pethő writes. “Among the 
people of Turkic race storming Europe, only the Hungarians remained as a genus 
without a brotherly branch. As Bulgarians and Bessenyők disappeared of the stage of 
history; the Hungarians stood alone against the solidarity of the Aryan universe of 
Christendom. The question was either to become Christian or disappear.” However, 
later religious difference unleashed a life and death duel between the two rokonfajta 
(kin nations) [Hungarians and Ottoman Turks]” which the Turks won with military 
superiority and religious fanaticism that transformed the whole the Turkish nation into 
an army.
13
 Later, Hungarians bandwagoned onto what Farkas indicated as “the 
attention toward the East, as foreign policy of the [Austro-Hungarian] monarchy, and 
the eastern fashion that could globally be felt”. This had a remarkable impact to 
enhance the Asian oriented interest in Hungary. In Hungary, we can find the sources 
of the modern manifestation of keletiség (easternness) as a political ideology at the 




 The Eastern interest in this respect was an expression of 
disappointment with Europe and glance towards the East as the real address of 
                                            
12
 Christopher Kelly, Attila the Hun Barbarian Terror and the Fall of the Roman Empire (London: 
Vintage Books, 2008), pp.228-229.  
13
 Sándor Pethő, Világostól Trianonig A Mai Magyarország Kialakulásának Története (Budapest: 
Enciklopédia R.-T. Kiadása, 1925), pp.11-15.  
14




 As we will see later, this has eventually become an undertone of 
relations with Eurasia especially in the interwar period.  
Such sentimental stimulation encouraged the Hungarian Turanists most 
notably well-known academics, politicians and nobles inaugurated the Turani 
Tarsaság (Turan Society) in the same year.
16
 The founding book of the society states 
its aim as to teach, to develop, and to recognize the sciences, arts, and economies of 
Asian and kin nations of Hungary in Europe, and harmonize them with Hungarian 
interests.
17
 In brief, the activities of the Turan Society comprised of organizing 
informative conferences about other Turanic societies and organizing anthropological, 
socio-economic research trips in Anatolia, the Caspian Sea region, the Caucasus and 
inner Asian lands to study the economic conditions of these locations.
18
 According to 
Önen, although in the initial years, the interest of the public opinion towards these 
activities remained limited, with the support of official institutions, such activities 
gained an increasing public interest in time.
19
  
While Turanism contributed to the Hungarian intellectual sphere until the 
World War II
20
, it was also divisive. Some considered it as neither linguistic, nor 
historical, nor ethno-geographical nor political, but merely geographical,
21
 for others 
this signified civilizational, racial, or simply historical associations sometimes at the 
face of maltreatment by the West. At the extremes, we have reactionary works such as 
by Miklós I. Gömbös
22
, which states that Hungarians are not without kin and they can 
turn to their Asiatic brethren at the face of their deception by the West at the end of 
                                            
15
 Nizam Önen, Turancı Hareketler: Macaristan ve Türkiye (1910–1944) (Ankara: Ankara University 
Press, 2013), pp.28-29. 
16
 Tarık Demirkan, Macar Turancıları (Istanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfi, 2000), 
p.26. 
17
 A Turáni Tarsaság Alapszabályai (1910). 
18
 Balázs Ablonczy, Teleki Pál (Budapest: Osiris Kiado, 2005). 
19
 Önen, Turancı Hareketler: Macaristan ve Türkiye (1910–1944), pp. 31-32. 
20
 Ali Engin Oba, Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu (Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, 1995), p.13. 
21
 Ablonczy, Teleki Pál 
22
 Miklós Gömbös, Turáni Kérdés (Bonyhád: At Raubitschek Izór, 1922). 
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the World War I. Hereby, the reference is to the 1920 Trianon Treaty that cost 
Hungary a large part of its territory. A parallel reflection on the Hungarians’ 
relationship with the West was presentation of Hungarians as the civilization makers. 
One can note Paikert’s work to this extent on Hungarian’s relation with the original 
creators of civilizations, such as Sumerians, Hittites or the Cretans as well as lost 
civilizations of Himalayas and Central Asia.
23
 Paikert, thereby, emphasized that the 
Turanian creativity is immemorial and great in the past as well as in the future. 
In the post-Trianon Treaty political landscape that saw Hungary losing chunks 
of its territory after World War I, the most important institutions which defined and 
controlled the terms of public speech were government bodies and social organization 
of the right and extreme nationalist right. This is where I believe the social control 
mechanism had resided. The interwar irredentist public atmosphere was a factor, 
which the official politics had the opportunity to utilize, neglect or stifle. The 
controllers of public life grasped the first, instinctively and consciously at the same 
time and thus the content and the tone of dominant anti-Trianon emotions were 
defined by domestic propaganda with the government’s approval or exactly to its 
liking. In this way, general public opinion became a projection of the propaganda. 
Under these circumstances public thinking was essentially defined by simplifying 
voices, which, on the one hand, provided an understandable, comforting and 
self-absolving explanation for the break up – such as the formula of a honest victim 
and a cruel enemy for demonizing opponents – and at the same time it tamed down 
the partition of the country insofar as it put it on a moral level, away from the world 
of political realities. Instead of realistically exploring the causes and consequences, 
the mythical concept aimed at a national self-therapy and mobilization, made public 
                                            
23
 Alajos Paikert, Turáni Mult, Turáni Jövő (Különlenyomat a Turán, 1931), pp.3-7. 
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thinking schematic and public opinion more uniform. The irredentist theme became a 
part of everyday life.
24
 As we will see, later this irredentism fed into the development 
of Turanism at its later stages to formulate the terms of an alliance with the Eastern 
nations at the face of disappointment with the West.  
Beyond intellectual history, in background of the more “scientific” debates 
about Turanism lied the racial roots of Hungarians. Hereby, one can mention the 
conflict between whether Hungarians have a mixed blood between the Finn-Ugor and 
Ural-Altay nations, advocated by the Hungarian Turkologist Ármin Vámbéry,
25
 and 
more racially fixed elaborations on Hungarian genes by the racist biologist Lajos 
Méhely (sometimes spelled also as Méhelÿ).
26
 According to the latter, while the 
Hungarian peasantry bore the characteristics of Finn-Ugor nations both with their 
physical characteristics and work habits, the Hungarian nobility should have been of 
Turkic origin given their gallantry, statesmanship, and strong physical features. After 
all, according to this ideology, it was the Turanian people that have always 
established major and powerful empires, glorious deeds of war, magnificent leaders, 
and all achievements of civilization bears their names.
27
  
Yet, as Ablonczy underlined, along civilizational or racial debates, the 
Turanist movement sought economic advantages in enhancing Hungary’s relations 
with the Eastern nations. For Hungary, Turanism practically promised new markets in 
its competition with Germany and Austria as well as a political position to balance 
Pan-Germanism and Pan-Slavism.
28
 At a meeting of the Turan Society on 31 January 
1914, the vice-president Alajos Paikert stated that Hungary does not have any 
                                            
24 Miklós Zeidler, “Irredentism in Everyday Life in Hungary during the Interwar Period,” Regio  
(2002), pp. 71-88.  
25
 Ármin Vámbéry, A Magyarság Keletkezése es Gyarapodása  (Budapest: Franklin-Tarsulat, 1895). 
26
 János Gyurgyák, Magyar Fajvedők (Budapest: Osiris, 2012). 
27
 Farkas, “A turánizmus,” p.865.  
28
 Ablonczy, Teleki Pál , p.90. 
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colonies and it does not endeavor to possess any. However, there was a need for 
economic expansion, support the other brotherly nations of Turan, and instigate 
exalted feelings of reciprocity and togetherness.
29
 One can underline a tone of “white 
men’s burden” in Paikert’s conceptualization of the role that the Hungarians were to 
play vis-à-vis their Turanian brethren. Gömbös went as far as calling out for “digging 
out the hard clot of the Asia”. He continued: “dig, dig, dig out the past, [not only that 
but also] the Hungarian past”.30 As such, the Hungarian elite pursued Turanism as a 
quest to seek political and economic benefits beyond their borders, the Turanic 
symbols-pagan warriors on horseback, roaming the Asian steppes became constant 
elements of the symbolism and rhetoric that Turanists aspired.
31
  
As an extension of the ideal, Japan has also featured in Turanist dreams as a 
frame of reference. Crucially, references to Japan in Hungarian Turanism also fed into 
what we may call “Hungarian imperialism”. As Farkas indicates within the 
Austro-Hungarian monarchy, as a part of an influential major power, Hungary could 
present itself in Europe as a “kingmaker” of politics. The political elite at the time had 
framed the millennium celebrations of Hungarian honfoglalás (Hungarian settlement 
in the Carpathian basin) as a manifestation of the fundamental role Hungary occupied 
in the Danube area. The idea of Hungarian self-contained imperialism illustrated itself 
in a Hungarian display of “major power consciousness”. This imperialism configured 
the expansionist version of Turanism with the desire to spread Hungarian industry 
towards the East (primarily the Balkans), establish first economic then political space 
towards the East. This was the particular inclination of the Turanist idea that fostered 
                                            
29
 László Szendrei, A Turanizmus (Gödöllő: Attraktor, 2010), p.17. 
30
 Gömbös, Turáni Kérdés, p.9. 
31
 Paul A. Hanebrink, In Defense of Christian Hungary. Religion, Nationalism, and Antisemitism, 
1890–1944 (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 2009), p.118. 
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friendship beyond the two European Turanian nations, namely Bulgaria and Turkey, 
to Japan as a victor of 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War.
32
  
To this extent, 1 June 1924 saw the establishment of the Magyar-Nippon 
Society
33
 with an active role played by István Mezey. The origins of the society date 
back to the role that Japan played for the return of the Hungarian prisoners of war 
after the W.W.I, who were taken to Siberia. The Hungarians noted the role that Japan 
played in protecting and providing for the safe return of these prisoners of war, and 
the Magyar-Nippon Society presented the case for deepening of relations between the 
two countries.
34
 Similar to the Turanian movement, one can note diverging interests 
within the Magyar-Nippon Society as well. Enhancement of mutual knowledge 
between Hungary and Japan was one of the aims of the society, and the general theme 
of its work partially related to Turanism.
35
 In this context, in 1925 the Society 
emphasized the difference between the Hungarian and Japanese Turanism. Having 
noted that “Asia is for Asians” character of Japanese Turanism attractively hastened 
the interest of the Turanian nations, the cultivation of economic and cultural links 
received more emphasis in the Hungarian Turanian movement than political 
alliance.
36
 Nonetheless, this period also saw exchanges between the Hungarian and 
the Japanese Turanists. One should note the travels of Benedek Baráthosi Balogh 
from 1903 to 1914 to collect more information of Hungarians for the everyday history 
of ancient Hungarians in Amur River, Sakhalin and Hokkaido regions to collect 
                                            
32
 Farkas, “A turánizmus,” p. 862.  
33
 Instead of Hungarian-Japanese Society, I will use Magyar-Nippon Society all throughout the text in 
order to reflect the origins of this society in Hungarian and Japanese rather than fully Anglicizing the 
term.  
34
 Ildikó Farkas, “A Magyar-Nippon Tarsaság,” in: István Szerdahelyi and Péter Wintermantel, eds., 
Japanológiai Körkép, (Budapest, 2007), 87-109, p.88.  
35
 Ibid., 92 
36
 Farkas, 93 
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Manchu and Ainu artefacts.
37
 In the 1920s, Baráthosi Balogh and his Japanese 
counterpart Juichiro Imaoka became the voice of Turanism in Japan, bringing the 




Amidst these exchanges, Japan featured as a country with which Hungary 
could establish industrial, economic, and commercial links. To this extent, it is crucial 
to note Nándor Metzger, the correspondent of the Hungarian News Agency in Tokyo, 
reporting about his evening program.  
The evening time serves for me to extend with societal propaganda the 
import of Tokaji wine, Szeged paprika, and Hungarian medicinal specialties 
in Japan. […] Us, poor Hungarians, we lack money for expensive 
advertising in newspapers. Here, only after establishing personal 
connections, we can echo the Hungarian case only through establishing 
p e r s o n a l  a c q u a i n t a n c e  e i t h e r  i n t e l l e c t u a l  o r  m a t e r i a l .
39
 
   
As we will see below, this economizing approach to Eurasianism, along with 
emphasizing the “bridge” function of Hungary for connecting East and West, have 
been recurrent themes in Hungarian foreign policy.
40
  
In the second half the 1930s, while the Turanist still called for a unity between 
the Turanian nations and the bridging role that Hungary could play between Europe 
and Asia, there also emerged a bifurcation in the Turanian ideology. Its expansionist 
and the defensive versions had separated from each other. The former pursued its 
ideology first following the aspired alliance between the Turanian nations such as 
Bulgaria and Japan, and second with an emphasis on the racist character in Turanist 
                                            
37
 Gábor Wilhelm, “Benedek Baráthosi Balogh Collection in the Museum of Ethnography, Budapest: 
Artifacts, Manuscripts, and Photos”, in: Museum of Ethnography, Budapest Baráthosi Balogh 
Collection Catalogues (Hokkaido, 1999), pp.85-89. 
38
 Sinan Levent, “Common Asianist intellectual history in Turkey and Japan: Turanism” Central Asian 
Survey (2015). DOI:10.1080/02634937.2015.1062601.  
39
 MOL P 1384 8
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 batch cited in Farkas, “A Magyar-Nippon Tarsaság,” p.96.  
40
 See Farkas, “A Magyar-Nippon Tarsaság” for a depiction of debates in Távol Kelet, the official 




 In this context, the defensive version of Turanism looked for establishing 
alliance with the Turanian nations to balance the pan-German and pan-Slavic 
influences on Hungary. In this vein, the Turanists called an “end to the age of servility 
to the West”, pledged not to “shed more blood in the defense of the Occident”, and 
called for the “unification of all Turanians” against the dual evils of “Semitic 
corruption and Aryan decadence”.  
In the first half of the 20
th
 century, Turanism became part of the extreme 
rights’ official rhetoric.42 The turning point for the Hungarian Turanists in the 20th 
century was the emergence of Italian fascism. The Turanists started to admire 
Mussolini, considering him as the leader of a bloodless revolution and admiring his 
resistance to socialist irrationality, anarchy and his struggle to establish rule and 
order.
43
 There were conspicuous efforts to implement fascism in Hungary at this 
period and reaching beyond Italy, the Hungarian Turanists also looked for ways to 
co-operate with their Turkish counterparts.
44
 In this context, despite its previous 
emphasis on economic and cultural links, some proponents of Turanism in Hungary, 
primarily István Mezey, adopted a pro-Japanese tone with response to Japan’s 
troubles in the international system in the aftermath of its occupation of Manchuria.  
Mezey justified Japanese expansionism referring to increasing population in 
Japan without any possibilities for migrating, and the need for raw materials and 
markets for the [growing] Japanese economy.
45
Hence, the Hungarian-Japanese 
approachment under the frame of Turanism, turned into emphasizing common aims, 
and a symbol of Hungarian expansionism as Japan joined Germany over the course of 
                                            
41
 Farkas, “A turánizmus,” p. 865.  
42
 Rudolf Paksa, A magyar szélsőjobboldal története. (Budapest: Jaffa, 2012).  
43
 Szendrei, A Turanizmus, p.26.  
44
 Demirkan, Macar Turancıları, p.58.  
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 In this respect, the supporters of Hungarian-Japanese relationship 
emphasized the special interest of Japan towards Hungary, the special position of 
Hungary between East and West, and the realization of Hungary’s bridge role in this 
respect, and references to fresh spirit of Asia for the issue of renewal of old Europe.
47
 
Furthermore, the mutual fear of Soviet Union strengthened the political ideological 
service of Turanism as a basis for approachment between Japan and Hungary. That 
Hungary should be in a military bloc in Central Europe friendly with Japan and 
against the Soviet Union in case Japan has started reckoning with Soviet Union in the 
Far East found support within the Hungarian diplomatic circles.
48
 Overall, the 
discursive construction of Hungarians are alone, without any relatives in Europe 
especially following the Trianon Treaty, and among the foreign nations Hungarians 
stay alone with their Eastern roots contributed to a search for alliances in the Turanian 
lands among the Hungarian elite.
49
 In the aftermath of the catastrophic World War II 
and the installation of the communist regime, however, the Turanist discourse ebbed 
away and the alleged Scythian-Hunnish roots of Hungarians became at best 
marginalized. 
ANTI-WESTERN RESENTMENT, NEW MORAL POLITICS,  
AND SOCIAL CONTROL 
Moreh states that the best to conceive Turanism old and new is as a search for 
the “ancestral homeland” (őshaza). In this sense, home is more than a place; it is an 
emotionally based and meaningful relationship between people and their 
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 Farkas, “A Magyar-Nippon Tarsaság,” p. 103. 
47
 Farkas, “A Magyar-Nippon Tarsaság,” p. 105.  
48
 Mihály Jungerth-Arnóthy moszkvai követ jelentése Mamoru Sigemicu japán nagykövettel folytatott 
beszélgetéséről (27.10.1938). Uo. 15/1. Tétel, 180/pol.-1938.sz. in Balázs Ablonczy, “Lándzahegy, 
néprokonság, small talk,” in: Pál Pritz, Balázs Sipos, and Miklós Zeidler, eds., Magyar külpolitikai 
gondolkodás a 20. Században (Budapest: Magyar Történelmi Társulat, 2006), available at, 
http://mek.oszk.hu/05200/05284/05284.htm. 
49
 Farkas, “A turánizmus,” p.867; Ablonczy, ibid.   
 16 
environment. Thus, being at home is a mode of being whereby we are oriented within 
a spatial, temporal, and sociocultural order that we understand.
50
 However, what is 
particularly of interest in the Hungarian case is how political and cultural resentment 
to the West in the shape of Eurasianism offered an alternative also to the morality that 
the West has represented. The mode of prevalent anti-Westernism adopted 
Eurasianism following the global financial crisis, particularly, propagated a 
mythically constructed East resting on social representations of a community 
alternative to the West. To this extent, a new type of moral politics as a 
counter-discourse to westernization set the mode of resentment. This does not mean 
that nationalist conservative politics became fully rejectionist of Europe per se. Yet, 
they emphasized particular value systems of non-European people in order to correct 
the wrongdoings of the West. In order to explore the unfolding of this process, in this 
section, I will first illustrate my operationalization of moral politics and then the 
recent Hungarian anti-westernism, led by the conservative right Fidesz and the 
extreme right Jobbik Party, as a discursive tool to promote a new domestic “moral 
politics” following on from the historical legacies depicted above.  
The Fidesz victory in April 2010 election in Hungary delivered a conservative 
revolution called the “revolution of ballot boxes”. In the words of Orbán, the 
constitutional revolution of Fidesz is a citizen/bourgeois revolution; not a bloody one 
like the Bolshevik Revolution, but aimed at ensuring that revolutionary morale be 
anchored in Hungarian democracy.
51
 In an assertive and defiant manner, Fidesz made 
its own constitution to generate Hungary that the right wing has craved for decades. It 
has hence veered away extensively from its liberal origins during the political 
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transformation, and could introduce its nationalist conservative politics adopted in late 
1990s fully into Hungarian politics thanks to its two-thirds parliamentary majority. 
Simultaneously, Fidesz commenced a revolutionary economic transformation to beat 
the two inherent problems of Hungarian economy, that is, high debt and 
unemployment. The hegemony-aspirant program of Fidesz has pursued alternative 
modernization, strong state, and nation vis-à-vis its liberal foes. Furthermore, the 
global economic crisis and the resultant insecurity also replenished Orbán’s new 
economic project that qualified being in debt as anti-Hungarian and a sign of the lack 
of moral standards. To this extent, Fidesz represented the 2008-2009 crisis not only as 
a global crisis, but rather a crisis of western values, or defined more broadly, of the 
western system.
52
 Under such circumstances, political discourse is shifting again, 
driven by the rediscovery of yet another new/old theory that would place Hungary at 
the heart of the new system, in an “ethical” home untainted by the West’s “crisis of 
values”.53  
To this extent, the underlying element of anti-westernism and the emphasis on 
the need for a new morality illustrate how fundamentally the reacquisition of 
morality, alternative to its western element, has been embedded into new conservative 
politics in Hungary. Thereby, we need to understand what is so typical of the new 
moral politics different from its western version.  
Morality is an imaginative concept. Our fundamental moral concepts, our 
understanding of situations, our reasoning about these situations are imaginatively 
structured.
54
 Moral politics vies for a political system that not only bolsters an 
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ideologically defined morality, but also strives to govern it. A great many people in 
liberal democratic and illiberal electoral democratic systems believe that the way out 
of our present moral confusions is to get clear about the ultimate moral principles or 
laws that ought to govern our lives and learn about how to apply them rationally to 
the concrete situations we encounter every day. While people disagree about the 
sources of moral principles, they all agree that living morally is principally a matter of 
moral insight into the ultimate moral rules, combined with the strength of will to do 
the right thing that is required by those rules.
55
 In this context, moral politics is 
extensively studied in the US.
56
 It has been considered widely a tool employed by 
conservative or neo-conservative political agendas in this literature, although Lakoff 
refers to conflicting moral action between the liberals and the conservatives to 
indicate that we should not write off the liberal stance as immoral at the outset.
57
  
In the European context, moral politics is a research theme that is developing 
in studies of populism and reaction of the right wing to the European liberal agenda.
58
 
The new proponents of moral politics reject the agenda of liberalism essentially as the 
non-domestic. In the Hungarian context, this rejection comes with a search for a more 
beneficial alternative geopolitical association that manifests itself in the form of 
Eurasianism. Moving further from Holmes’s “integralist forms” within supporters of 
conservative traditionalist socio-political relations, we can note four registers. They 
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are, in order, framework of meaning; practice of everyday life; idiom of solidarity; 
and as a consciousness of belonging linked to a specific cultural milieu.
59
 I argue that 
moral politics offers a comprehensive category whereby these registers can find 
expression. The emergence, consolidation, and long-term maintenance of moral 
politics derive from the capacity of political actors to convince the wider public on the 
tenets of their ideologies. Thereby, the emergence of micro foundations of moral 
politics indicates the consolidation of a new moral order in the long-term. To this 
extent, this article proposes that we need to understand how mythically constructed 
geopolitical alternatives help to re-formulate identities in order to bolster new moral 
agendas.  
The western association for the Hungarian liberal elite has always signified a 
level of civilization imbued by economic and political openness. In the beginning this 
implied a more equal re-stratification of society, land reform, freedoms and rights for 
all including the Jews, economic transition to industry and trade, and a general 
embourgeoisement of the society.
60
 Much recently, in the 1990s, the European Union 
membership element has become the main anchor of the process of westernization. 
The Europeanist claim in the 1990s was crucial, as the then East European 
nationalism was based on the idea that these nations were not any more the “poor” 
relative” of Europe, but fully fledged “civilized” nations just being allowed to join 
their “natural homeland Europe”. Then, their main perspective was that of sneering 
the real East against which countries like Hungary represent the bridgehead of the 
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 Overall, the western orientation has also implied rapid changes in 
socio-economic relations such as privatization, gender rights, social policy reforms, 
and a more developed regime of rights and freedoms for ethnic and sexual minorities. 
This brought with itself a comprehensive shake up in domestic and public life of the 
society as well as re-making of privileges in socio-economic relations.  
In order to contravene these tendencies, the anti-western tendencies in the 
nationalist conservative right-wing discourse have proposed a type of moral politics 
imbued by social representations of Hungarian society alternative to the West. There 
were also nativist opponents to this transformation during the early years of 
transformation as well. One can mention Csurka and his MIÉP (The Hungarian 
Justice and Life party) party after he broke up from the conservative MDF (Hungarian 
Democratic Forum) - the party that gained office after the first democratic election. 
However, in their case anti-Bolshevik, anti-liberal, anti-Semitic stances were more 
important that the course of westernization in Hungary per se.
62
   
In a way, especially in the aftermath of EU membership, an alternative 
socio-economic framework, inspired by a mythically constructed East both in present 
and the past represented a more traditional, patriarchal, religious society, implied an 
alternative to the westernization goal of the liberals. Within this myth, the nationalist 
conservatives both among the ranks of Fidesz and Jobbik claimed, Hungarians could 
be more confident of and comfortable with their life styles, gender relations, and 
general socio-economic system. This myth made the East an illiberal alternative to the 
liberal west. This alternative system required a re-organization of the society, which I 
have introduced above as the basis of social control, in order to undo the Western 
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effect on family systems, economic production and markets, social stratification, and 
role of religion in society. Let us below to how Eurasianism related to this system 
building.  
 
ECONOMIZATION OF SOCIAL RELATIONS TO FOLLOW 
THE EURASIAN PARADIGM 
In order to depict the social control mechanism that Eurasianism pursues more 
clearly, I will depart from Wendy Brown’s work on the role that “economization of 
subjects”.63 Çalışkan and Callon define economization as a process defining the 
dissemination of neoliberal market metrics to all other spheres of life and human 
activity.
64
 Hence, according to Brown, neoliberal homo oeconomicus takes its shape 
as human capital, seeking to strengthen its competitive positioning and appreciate its 
value. Homo oeconomicus as human capital is concerned with enhancing its portfolio 
value in all domains of its life and activity undertaken through practices of 
self-investment and attracting investors. This type of economization configures the 
state as the manager of a firm and the subject as a unit of entrepreneurial and 
self-investing capital.
65
 Henceforth, human capital replaces labor as all market actors 
are rendered as capitals. To this Foucault adds that multiplying the enterprise from 
within the social body is what is at stake in neoliberal policy and what makes 
neoliberalism more much than a set of economic policies. Rather it is a matter of 
                                            
63
 Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (New York: Zone Books, 
2015). 
64
 Çalışkan and Callon, “Economization, part 1”.  
65
 Brown, Undoing the Demos, pp.33-34, 41.  
 22 
making the market, competition, and so the enterprise into what could be called the 
formative power of the society.
66
 
To this extent, the search for new geopolitical alliances in Hungary should be 
understood within the Prime Minister Orbán’s role of shifting the people from one 
comfortable reality to a new and less familiar one in a new environment within which 
a new system of sensemaking takes place.
67
 The rest of this section explores how a 
new definition of morality surfaced in Hungary as the Prime Minister appealed to the 
collective rationality of the public to endorse his search for geopolitical alternatives to 
alleviate the impacts of the crisis and failure of liberalism. I consider this new 
morality as the narrative that contributes to economization of society following 
non-western and illiberal social relations.   
In 2010, in his first speech after becoming Prime Minister, delivered to the 
Hungarian Permanent Conference, a body that represents Hungarian ethnics in the 
neighboring countries, Orbán stated that while there should be no doubt that they 
belong to the Western world, “from now on, this fact will suggest another 
connotation. In a simplified or caricaturized way, we are sailing under the Western 
flag, but in world economy an Eastern wind blows. And the sailor that does not take 
into consideration according to which wind to rotate the sails will doom himself and 
his cargo”.68 What started then as keleti nyitás, i.e., opening to the East, as initially 
required by the new economic realities, more recently came to mean a new political 
identification.  
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In July 2014, Orbán promised to institutionalize an illiberal state in Hungary 
in order for the country to manage a post-2008 crisis world where “anything became 
possible”, while alluding to the “success of illiberal and perhaps non-democratic 
countries such as Singapore, China, India, Russia and Turkey” as “stars” in 
international economic performance. Emphasizing the achievements of illiberal 
countries, Orbán continued, that in order for Hungary to prosper in the race for global 
competitiveness, it should explore ways to tear itself away from the dogmas and 
ideologies of Western Europe such as liberalism.
69
 This discourse simultaneously 
pervades and responds to a sense of insecurity felt in the Hungarian public sphere and 
legitimizes the discursive positioning of Orbán vis-à-vis the liberal metanarrative 
Europeanization that gripped Hungarian politics since 1989.  
Ideologically, conservative right-wing proponents of the policy that supports 
opening to the East primarily list problems in the European economy such as its 
current political structures, the introduction of the euro as an economic project, the 
center-periphery conflict leading to “colonization of the periphery” by the center.70 
However, Orbán’s opposition to the West had deeper roots than economy. In 2007, 
Orbán stated that “a new political and spiritual era started in Europe and a new type of 
politics is evolving” at the dawn of liberalism of 1968 with its moral relativism, 
demands for full individual freedoms, and feeble communal bonds.
71
 According to 
Orbán, liberalism of 1968 resembled neoliberalism, and they needed a renewed 
emphasis on national character and social market economy to maintain the market, 
society, individual freedom, and communal interest. Instrumentally, this renewed 
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emphasis would curtail “individual freedom [which] after a while batters away the 
order of procreation and forces unnatural life styles upon the European peoples”.72 It 
is evident that while critical of neoliberalism, Orbán also uttered a clear message that 
increased freedom would bring forward unnatural life styles and was sinful. 
At the same time, Orbán has raised issues of Europe, liberalism, and 
conservatism imbuing the message that liberalism was perilous for Europe and that 
Fidesz could counter this menace in Hungary and Europe. Orbán qualified European 
and Christian credentials of Hungary, while enmeshing a series of conservative 
concepts in how Europe with Hungary should be.
73
 These manifestations showed that 
Fidesz was skeptical and rejectionist of the liberal tradition of West, but not what 
Orbán affiliates with Europe, namely, national traditions and sovereignties, family, 
cohesion, and Christian solidarity. As I illustrate below, these very issues appear of 
importance to the Eurasian discourse as well.  
What guides the belief that freedoms lead to decadence in Fidesz-led 
elaboration of the crisis of the liberal system originates from Tilo Schabert’s 
post-liberal and autocratic political stance on leadership. Schabert’s writings 
particularly on order echoes in the “illiberal” democracy narrative of Fidesz.74 
Schabert argued that human beings would hardly continue to exist, beyond savagery 
at least, if their lives were not maintained by some form of economic, social and 
political order. Yet, as a paradigm of civilization, modernity means exactly the 
complete negation of any such order. The idea of “modern civilization”, therefore, 
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embodies a paradox. “Modernity” stands in absolute contradiction to civilization. 
Neither a modernity of civilization – a “modernized” order of life; nor a civilization 
of modernity – an order of life in a “modern” anarchy – can actually be achieved. 
Instead, there is only continuing conflict. Or to put it more succinctly, the “modern” 
may account for the crisis of modern civilization.
75
 If these ideas appeared merely 
within the frame of increasing authoritarianism in the country, one could have 
imagined them as regression in democratic standards. However, as they are 
bandwagoned to increasing interest in Eastern semi-democracies or authoritarian 
systems, we have grounds to debate the anti-liberal narrative within the frame of 
Eurasianism. Moreover, if we consider this narrative within the frame of Orbán’s 
above noted discourse on work and limitless freedom, we would have grounds to 
appreciate how social relations are economized following the “imagined” Asian work 
ethics that brings forth efficiency rather than limitless freedom of liberalism.  
The economization of political relations with the East is more straightforward 
to explain. According to the then Under-Secretary of Foreign and External Economic 
Relations Péter Szijjartó, who became the Foreign Minister in 2014, the Hungarian 
opening to the East rests on four pillars. These are: first, building close ties with the 
Far East – especially with China; second, strengthening cooperation with Caucasus 
countries such as Georgia, Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, as their trade strategies fit 
well with the supply structure of the Hungarian market; third, paying more attention 
and refining the trade links with the Arab world; and finally, concentrating on the 
Western Balkans.
76
 Truly, looking for new markets during the economic crisis has 
been a common trend in Austria, Germany and the UK.
77
 Yet, as Kálnoky states, 
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there is no talk of an Eastern opening in Germany in order to connote a basic market 
search with a new geopolitical direction.
78
 When interviewed the Hungarian 
Ambassador to Kazakhstan suggested that while the Westerners go east to look for 
new markets they come with their capital. Hungary lacks this capital, but it has 
historical and cultural capital with which it can reach to the East.
79
  
Particularly in effect to the relations with Japan, the Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán’s speech at the presentation of Suzuki’s new model in its factory at Esztergom 
is also noteworthy. Reflecting on Hungarian car industry and the time frame during 
which Suzuki has operated in Hungary over the past 25 years, Orbán states:  
There was a car manufacturing industry in Hungary before the Second 
World War, but it was swiftly ended by communism; we Hungarians only 
had the chance to tinker with our own COMECON cars at home in the 
privacy of our garages, so as to create the impression that they had 
something to do with us […] with Suzuki Hungarian families could at last 
own a “western” car – which through an irony of fate is actually from the 
Far East. This is why we Hungarians still regard each and every model 




While in the same speech Orbán also goes into details about the “work ethics” of the 
Japanese and how the Hungarians also wish to ascribe to the Japanese belief in “work 
alone can bring about long-term advancement and prosperity for the inhabitants of the 
country, for the purposes of this article what matters most is his identification of 
Hungarians with the Eastern that appears Western. In the interwar period, as I 
illustrated above, it was also common to see Eastern markets promising new 
opportunities for Hungary. We can then consider Orbán’s discourse in relation to 
Nándor Metzger’s attempts in the interwar period as to how Hungary should make 
itself visible in Japan. In both instances, the East is pragmatically connoted to 
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Hungarian identity so that Hungarians can reach out and find their true economic 
potential.    
Beyond Fidesz, more recently, this desire to reach out to the Eastern nations 
finds expression in the politics of the extreme right Jobbik in Hungary under the 
banner of neo-Turanism. In essence, this ideology aspires to terminate Hungary’s 
alliance with the Euro-Atlantic community and instead form a cultural, political and 
economic alliance with the Uralo-Altaic tribes of Siberia and Russia, and even 
Mongolians, Koreans, and Japanese.
81
 The most daring declaration of Eurasianism 
among Jobbik ranks occurred in January 2010. Two Jobbik politicians, Márton 
Gyöngyösi and Tamás Hegedűs authored a long report entitled “The Strategic Turn 
towards the East” in the party newsletter Barikád. Hereby, the emphasis was that not 
only that the center of gravity in world economy was shifting towards the East due to 
the financial crisis in the West, but also the eastern societies showed that they could 
maintain their integrity, traditional community and value systems better than the 
westerners.  
The authors referred to the increasing importance that the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization acquired lately as an opponent of the unipolar American 
hegemony, how the post-Cold War considerations of Huntington and Fukuyama on 
the future of the Western domination were bound to fail, and the deep crisis in Europe 
not only in terms of economy but also values, demography, and Christianity. In this 
picture, the authors depicted Hungary lacking economic sovereignty, with a national 
self-consciousness in tatters, and general health and demographic indicators rapidly 
worsening. In other words, the Hungarian people had become frustrated, unhappy, 
and desperate. The authors suggested that a change in foreign policy orientation could 
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present the Hungarians with an economic and spiritual pedestal without which the 
country could not elevate itself from the crisis that they delineated. Hence, it was 
unquestionable that the country had to move away from the aging and decadent West 
– buckled under the strain of internal cohesion and identity problems, and move 
towards the firming East, which represented economic and demographic advantages.
82
   
Reflecting on the crisis and the conservative and extreme right response, 
Csizmadia, Csery, Jenei, Lakatos, Nagy, Novák and Paár indicate that there are many 
similarities between the modern politics of Hungary and the politics during the global 
economic crisis of the interwar economic environment that generated Turanism, 
namely the importance of non-allied politics, economic unorthodoxy, and finally 
hostility to banks and elites.
83
 There are also significant ramifications of 
extreme-right positions for Orbán insomuch as he depicts the Western liberals and 
international capitalists as the main actors that brought forth Hungary’s economic and 
political collapse in the 2000s. This has recently also triggered a welfare chauvinist 
anti-immigrant discourse and a referendum against the migrant quota imposed by the 
EU both directed at proponents of multi-culturalism in West in the shape of 




This article has placed the current anti-westernism voiced and practiced by the 
conservative right Fidesz and the Jobbik party within a historical framework. It 
illustrated that their anti-westernism is the culmination of a long tradition of a search 
for beneficial relations and moral politics for Hungary outwith Europe. In its current 
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shape this search expresses itself as a counter-discourse to Europeanization 
metanarrative that set much of the tone for the transformation in Hungary since early 
1990s. In contrast, the nationalist and conservative right has proposed more 
traditional, religious, communitarian, patriarchal as well as productive values 
vis-à-vis the individualism that the West has represented.  
Theoretically, the article reflects on social representation and collective 
memory literatures to illustrate that “identities are intentionally or deliberately chosen, 
used, and/or strategically manipulated”.85 Following Hopf’s theoretical work, this 
article shows that conservative and nationalist political and cultural elite in Hungary 
engage in a collective soul search on what formulates Hungarian identity, particularly 
at times of political and economic turmoil. They foster new identities alternative to 
that of their conceived challengers. In this effort, they also refer to commitment to 
traditional socio-economic relations within the Hungarian society to generate the 
basis of a vigorous engagement with the modern world.
86
 Yet, they also deliberately 
associate new elements to these identities in order to oppose the non-domestic that 
westernism propagates. Given the economic productivity and benefits oriented goals 
of the formulations of these new identities, I have contextualized them within the 
frame of economization.   
In this respect, the article centrally focused on identity making as an essential 
element of Eurasianism in Hungary. Coser noted that for Halbwachs the past is a 
social construction mainly, if not wholly, shaped by the concerns of the present. In 
this context, Halbwachs argued that the beliefs, interests, and aspirations of the 
present shape the various views of the past as they are manifested respectively in 
every historical epoch. Then, collective historical memory acquires both cumulative 
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and presentist aspects. It shows at least partial continuity as well as new readings of 
the past in terms of the present. A society’s current perceived needs may impel it to 
refashion the past, but successive epochs are being kept alive through a common code 
and a common symbolic canon even amidst contemporary revisions. In other words, 
Halbwachs’ work shows how the present affects the selective perception of past 
history insomuch as he stressed that our conceptions of the past are affected by the 
mental images we employ to solve present problems, so that collective memory is 
essentially a reconstruction of the past in the light of the present.
87
 I have deliberated 
on not only the current emphasis on Eurasianism, but also the reflections of 
Hungary’s relations with Eurasian nations extending all the way to Japan, considering 
this very framework.  
In this context, a repeating attempt in the discourse of the Hungarian 
right-wing elite has been the making or revising of collective memory of the past to 
respond to the current problems of the present in order to transform problematic into 
non-problematic in collective rationality. This attempt saw both the ideological 
transformation of the West as well as the East for the consumption of Hungarian 
public. The image of a morally corrupt liberal system has been associated to the West, 
whereas all references to economic self-sufficiency, productivity and family have 
been associated with the “illiberal” that Hungary should attempt to grow into 
following Eastern templates. The search for establishing social control over the public 
to this extent has been unique. Overall, this article depicts the formulation of a new 
hegemony in Hungary in the shape of Eurasianism and shows the impact of this 
ambiguous ideology over Hungarian political history.   
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